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Abstract
Where should we look to understand the origin of inequality? Most research
focuses on three windows of evidence: (1) the archaeological record; (2) exist-
ing traditional societies; and (3) the historical record. I propose a fourth window
of evidence — modern society itself. I hypothesize that we can infer the origin
of inequality from the modern relation between energy use, hierarchy, and in-
equality. To do this, I create a large-scale numerical model that is informed by
modern evidence. I then use this model to project modern trends into the past.
The results are promising. The model predicts an explosion of inequality with
the transition to agrarian levels of energy use. Subsequent increases in energy
use are predicted to have little effect on inequality. The results are broadly con-
sistent with the available evidence. This suggests that the hierarchical structure
of modern societies may provide a window into the origin of inequality.
Keywords: origin of inequality; hierarchy; energy; institution size; numerical model,
function, coercion
∗blairfix@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
Economic inequality is ubiquitous today, but it has not always been so. For
the vast majority of our existence, humans lived in egalitarian hunter-gatherer
bands [1]. Then around 10,000 years ago, inequality began to appear [2, 3].
It gradually spread until it became the defacto state of most societies. What
explains this monumental transition?
Scholars have speculated about the origin of inequality for at least two cen-
turies [2–11]. But only recently has substantial empirical evidence become avail-
able. There are currently three main ‘windows’ of evidence into the origin of
inequality. The first is the archaeological record [10–19]. The second window
is traditional societies that still exist [20–25]. The third window is the historical
(written) record of inequality [26–30].
I propose a fourth window — that evidence for the origin of inequality is en-
coded in the social structure of modern societies. I call this the energy-hierarchy-
inequality (EHI) hypothesis:
Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Hypothesis: We can infer the origin of inequality
using the modern relation between energy use, hierarchy, and inequality.
In modern societies, increases in energy use are associated with an increase in
institution size. If institutions are hierarchically organized, this suggests that
societies become more hierarchical as energy use increases. At the same time,
hierarchy plays a central role in income distribution. Income in case-study firms
scales strongly with hierarchical power (the total number of subordinates under
an individual’s control). This hints that the growth of hierarchy relates to the
growth of inequality.
To infer the origin of inequality, I propose that we reverse modern trends. We
look at the trend towards less energy use and less hierarchy (instead of greater
energy use and greater hierarchy). To conduct this extrapolation, I create a
large-scale numerical model that is informed by modern evidence. I then use
this model to project modern trends into the past. The result is a hindcast of the
origin of inequality — a prediction that can be compared to empirical evidence.
The results of this extrapolation are promising. The model predicts an ex-
plosion of inequality during the transition from subsistence to agrarian levels of
energy use. This is consistent with the available evidence. As energy use contin-
ues to increase, the model predicts that inequality should plateau. The evidence
here is more conflicting. Depending on the inequality metric used, there is ev-
idence that inequality declines slightly with industrialization. This may be be-
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cause hierarchies become less ‘despotic’ as energy use increases. Future research
is needed to test this possibility.
To summarize, I find that modern trends between energy, hierarchy and in-
equality provide a plausible window into the origin of inequality. The implica-
tion is that looking to the past is not the only way to understand the origin of
inequality. Signs of humanity’s deep history may be hidden in the structure of
our own societies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, reviews the evidence behind the
energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis. Section 3 describes the energy-hierarchy-
inequality model (for a technical discussion, see the Appendix). Section 4 presents
the model’s results, and Section 5 discusses some of the implications.
2 Energy, Hierarchy, and Inequality: The Evidence
There is a long history of connecting social evolution to energy use [31–40].
The motivation is simple: according to the laws of thermodynamics, a non-
equilibrium system must be supported by a flow of energy [41]. Since human
societies are non-equilibrium systems, energy should play an important role in
social evolution. The link between energy and inequality has been explored be-
fore [42–45]. But this work is the first (to my knowledge) to develop a formal
energy-inequality model and use it to investigate the origin of inequality.
I review here the evidence supporting the energy-hierarchy-inequality (EHI)
hypothesis. The chain of evidence is shown below:
energy −→ institution size −→ hierarchy −→ power −→ income
Arrows reflect the line of reasoning and not necessarily a line of causation.
2.1 Energy and Institution Size
The energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis begins with a link between energy
and institution size. In modern societies, institution size is strongly correlated
with energy use per capita [46,47]. Figure 1 illustrates this effect using business
firms. Figure 1A plots average firm size within different nations against their
energy use per capita. Each point represents a country, with error bars indicating
the uncertainty in average firm size. As energy use per capita increases, average
firm size increases as well.
The growth of average firm size is not caused by a horizontal shift in the
distribution. Instead, it is cause by a fattening of the distribution tail. Figure 1B
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Figure 1: How Firm Size Changes With Energy Use per Capita
Panel A shows how national average firm size (measured using the number of employ-
ees) varies with energy use per capita. Each data point is a country. Error bars in panel
indicate the 95% confidence interval of national mean firm size estimates. Grey regions
indicate the 95% confidence region of the regression. Panel B shows how the entire firm
size distribution within nations varies by energy consumption. Countries of the world
are first sorted by energy consumption quintiles. The firm size distribution for each
quintile is then plotted on a log-log scale. The inset graph shows average energy use
per capita within each quintile. Estimated firm size distribution power-law exponents
(α) are shown for each quintile.
visualizes this behavior. Here I group the countries of the world into quintiles (5
groups) ranked by energy use per capita. For each quintile, I plot the aggregate
firm size distribution. Note how the slope of the firm size distribution decreases
with greater energy use. This indicates that large firms become more common.
The firm-size distribution can be modeled by a power-law [48–51]. This
means that the probability of finding a firm of size x is roughly proportional
to x−α, where α is the power-law exponent. A smaller power-law exponent
indicates a fatter tail. As shown in Figure 1B, greater energy use is associated
with a smaller power-law exponent for the firm size distribution. This provides
a simple way to model the relation between energy use and firm size.
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Figure 2: Hierarchical Employment Structure of Six Case-Study Firms
This figure shows the hierarchical employment structure of six different case-study firms,
named after the study authors [52–57].
2.2 Institution Size and Hierarchy
The second step of the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis is to connect in-
stitution size to hierarchy. I hypothesize that (virtually) all human institutions
are hierarchically organized. This means they have a nested chain of command
that grows with institution size. As the hierarchy grows, new ranks are added at
a logarithmic rate [58,59]. This scaling behavior has been observed in business
firms [60], historical empires [61], and hunter-gather societies [62]. Hierarchi-
cal organization also means that elite ranks should become more common as a
hierarchy grows. One implication is that the management share of employment
should increase with average firm size (the assumption being that managers oc-
cupy top ranks). This trend has been observed at the international level [50].
The most direct evidence for hierarchical organization comes from firm case
studies [52–57]. Figure 2 shows the hierarchical structure of six case-study firms
(which come from Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States).
Although the specific structure varies, all six firms share the pyramid shape that
we expect of a hierarchy. I use these case studies to inform the energy-hierarchy-
inequality model (see the Appendix for details).
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To summarize, the evidence suggests that institutions tend to become larger
as energy use increases. If institutions are hierarchically organized, this implies
that the growth of energy is associated with the growth of hierarchy.
2.3 Hierarchical Power and Income
The last component of the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis is a relation
between hierarchical power and income. The idea is that elites use their power
within a hierarchy to gain preferential access to resources.
From an evolutionary perspective, there is good reason that hierarchy should
play a role in resource distribution. Virtually all social mammals form dom-
inance hierarchies [64–69]. A key characteristic of these hierarchies is that
social status confers preferential access to resources, particularly sexual mates
[70–75]. Given our evolutionary heritage, we expect that humans should ex-
hibit similar behavior. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong link between human
hierarchical status and reproductive success [76–80].
Is the same true for income? Evidence suggests so. But before looking at this
evidence, I note a key difference between human and non-human hierarchies.
All other animals form linear hierarchies — an ordinal ranking from top to bot-
tom. But humans form branching hierarchies, in which each superior controls
multiple subordinates. This has important consequences for income distribution.
In a branching hierarchy, the number of subordinates grows exponentially with
rank (Fig. 3). If income stems from power over subordinates, than it too should
increase exponentially with rank. This means that hierarchy can lead to vast
inequalities.
To make this relation quantitative, I define ‘hierarchical power’ as:
hierarchical power = 1+ number of subordinates (1)
This idea is that control over subordinates is a form of power — it increases the
“the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons” [81].
All individuals start with a baseline power of 1, indicating they have control over
themselves. Hierarchical power then increases proportionally with the number
of subordinates.
Is income within hierarchies a function of hierarchical power? Evidence from
case-study firms suggests so. Figure 4 plots average income (relative to the
bottom hierarchical level) against average hierarchical power for each rank in
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Figure 3: The Exponential Growth of Subordinates with Rank
In an idealized hierarchy, the total number of subordinates (blue) tends to grow expo-
nentially with hierarchical rank (red). The exact relation will depend on the span of
control — the number of subordinates directly below each superior.
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Figure 4: Average Income vs. Hierarchical Power Within Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from six firm case studies [52–57]. The vertical axis shows av-
erage income within each hierarchical level of the firm (relative to the base level) ,
while the horizontal axis shows my metric for average power, which is equal to one
plus the average number of subordinates below a given hierarchical level. Each point
represents a single firm-year observation, and color indicates the particular case study.
Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% prediction interval. See [63] for a
detailed discussion of sources and methods.
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Figure 5: The Growth of Hierarchy Concentrates Power
This figure illustrates how the growth of hierarchy leads to the concentration of hierar-
chical power. Below each hierarchy, I show the distribution of hierarchical power. (hier-
archical power = 1 + the total number of subordinates). I then calculate the Gini index
of hierarchical power concentration (G). The initial growth of hierarchy rapidly concen-
trates power. But further growth of hierarchy leads to progressively slower growth of
hierarchical-power concentration.
our six case-study firms. There is a strong correlation. A similar correlation
exists between changes in income and changes in hierarchical power [63].
The power-income relation implies that inequality should increase as a hier-
archy grows. This is because hierarchical power gets concentrated as a hierarchy
gets larger (Fig. 5). Importantly, this relation is non-linear. The initial growth
of hierarchy rapidly concentrates power. But further growth of hierarchy leads
to progressively slower growth of hierarchical-power concentration. If income
scales with hierarchical power, the same should be true of inequality. As a hier-
archy grows, inequality should explode and then plateau.
To summarize, modern evidence suggests a joint relation between energy
use, hierarchy, and inequality. As energy use increases, societies become more
hierarchical. If income is proportional to hierarchical power, this should cause
an increase in income inequality. To investigate the origin of inequality, I propose
that we extrapolate this relation back in time.
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3 An Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Model
To extrapolate the energy-hierarchy-inequality evidence, I create a large-scale
numerical model. This model simulates the empirical relation between energy,
hierarchy, and income. I discuss the basic components of the model below. For
a technical discussion, see the Appendix.
3.1 Model Assumptions
The energy-hierarchy-inequality model assumes that modern trends can be ex-
trapolated indefinitely into the past. This entails the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Institutions have a power-law size distribution. The growth of
institution size is synonymous with a decline in the power-law exponent.
Assumption 2: Institutions are hierarchically organized with a structure equiv-
alent to modern firm hierarchies.
Assumption 3: The modern trend between energy use per capita and institu-
tion size applies to all societies.
Assumption 4: Income scales with hierarchical power in all societies. The rate
of scaling may vary over time and space.
Are these assumptions realistic? Regarding assumption 1, there is evidence
that pre-capitalist societies had a power-law distribution of institution size. For
instance, feudal manor size was roughly power-law distributed [82, 83]. Simi-
larly, slave estate size in the antebellum American South was roughly power-law
distributed (see Fig. 11 in the Appendix). Evidence also suggests that hunter-
gatherer settlement sizes had a power-law distribution tail [84]. The types of
institution certainly vary across time and space. But regardless of type, the
power-law distribution of institution size seems common.
Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 are speculative. But given empirical evidence, why
not extrapolate it and see where it takes us?
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3.2 Model Structure
The energy-hierarchy-inequality model has four main steps, discussed below.
For technical details, see the Appendix.
Step 1: Generate the institution-size distribution. The model generates an
institution size distribution using a discrete power law. The power-law exponent
varies scholastically over different model iterations. This simulates changes in
institution size.
Step 2: Estimate energy use from institution size. Energy use is determined
from average institution size. The model uses the energy vs. firm-size regression
(Fig. 1A) for this estimate.
Step 3: Create hierarchical structure. The model uses firm case-study data
(Fig. 2) to determine the hierarchical structure of institutions. All modeled
institutions have the same ‘shape’, but the number of ranks varies with institution
size.
Step 4: Endow individuals with income Individual income scales with hier-
archical power as
income∝ (hierarchical power)β × (noise) (2)
where β determines the rate of scaling. To simulate variation between societies,
β varies scholastically between model iterations. I use case studies of modern
firms, as well as an antebellum US slave estate, to determine a plausible range for
this variation. The noise factor adds a small amount of dispersion to the power-
income relation. This is determined by income dispersion within hierarchical
levels of the case-study firms. On its own, the noise factor corresponds to a Gini
index of about 0.1.
Between-Institution Income Dispersion. The model excludes income disper-
sion between institutions. US evidence suggests that between-institution income
dispersion accounts for a minority of total income dispersion (about 30%) [85].
I assume that the growth of between-institution dispersion is not important for
the emergence of inequality. Future research can determine if this is an appro-
priate assumption.
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Figure 6: Visualizing the Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Model
This figure shows the EHI model as a landscape. Hierarchies are visualized as pyramids.
Height and color indicate hierarchical rank. The top panel shows a subsistence society
that consumes hunter-gatherer levels of energy use. The model predicts little hierar-
chical organization, and little concentration of hierarchical power. The bottom panel
shows an industrial society with energy use on par with modern Iceland or Qatar. The
model predicts considerable hierarchical organization, and considerable concentration
of hierarchical power.
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3.3 Visualizing the Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Model
Figure 6 visualizes the energy-hierarchy-inequality model as a landscape. Hier-
archies appear as pyramids, with hierarchical rank indicated by height and color.
On top is a subsistence society that consumes 5GJ of energy per capita per year.
This is 3200 Kcal per day — not much above the metabolic needs of an aver-
age person. Hierarchical organization is negligible. Consequently, hierarchical
power is very equally distributed, with a Gini index of 0.13. We expect very little
inequality in this society.
On the bottom is an industrial society that consumes 500GJ of energy per
capita per year — similar to modern Iceland or Qatar. Hierarchical organization
is ubiquitous. Consequently, hierarchical power is extremely concentrated, with
a Gini index of 0.76. We expect significant inequality in this society.
4 Extrapolating the Origin of Inequality
I use the EHI model to extrapolate the origin of inequality. Figure 7 shows the
predicted relation between energy use, the concentration of hierarchical power,
and inequality. There are four notable predictions:
1. Hierarchy vanishes at metabolic levels of energy use, causing a collapse
of inequality. Hierarchical organization vanishes as energy use approaches
metabolic levels (i.e. food energy only). Consequently, hierarchical-power con-
centration vanishes and inequality becomes negligible.
2. Inequality explodes during the transition to agriculture. Virtually all
increases in inequality occur during the transition from subsistence to agrarian
levels of energy use. (In Fig. 7, agrarian energy use is represented by Eastern
Eurasia from 5,000 BCE to 1500 CE [86]).
3. The range of inequality grows with energy use. The transition to agricul-
ture opens a huge range of ‘inequality space’. The governing factor is β — the
rate that income scales with hierarchical power. Societies with low β remain
equal during the transition to agriculture. But societies with high β experience
an explosion of inequality.
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Figure 7: Extrapolating the Origin of Inequality with the EHI Model
This figure show the results of the energy-hierarchy-inequality model. Panel A shows
how the concentration of hierarchical power changes with energy use per capita. Panel
B shows the evolution of income inequality. Color indicates the scaling exponent β
between hierarchical power and income (see Eq. 2). Shaded regions show the energy
use range for various societies throughout history. For sources and methods, see the
Appendix.
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4. Energy growth beyond agrarian levels has little effect on inequality. Af-
ter the transition to agriculture, the concentration of hierarchical power plateaus.
As a result, further increases in energy use have a negligible effect on inequality.
4.1 Testing the Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Prediction
The EHI model predicts how the emergence and evolution of inequality should
relate to energy use. Figure 8 compares this prediction to the available evidence.
Figure 8A compares the model to archaeological data for ancient societies.
The caveat is that the archaeological data measures inequality using house size
[18]. This is not strictly comparable to the ‘income inequality’ produced by
the EHI model. Nonetheless I make a comparison. The archaeological data
is grouped by societal adaptation. Horizontal error bars indicate the plausible
range of energy use for each adaptation. Points represent the mean estimate.
(For sources and methods, see the Appendix). The model’s prediction is consis-
tent with the archaeological evidence — inequality explodes during the transi-
tion to agriculture.
Figure 8B compares the model to data from pre-industrial societies [29].
Horizontal error bars show the uncertainty in energy use (which is estimated
from GDP). Again, the model is consistent with the empirical data. In pre-
industrial societies, inequality increases rapidly with energy use.
Figure 8C compares the model to modern evidence. The model’s range is
consistent with the empirical data. But there is a downward trend in the empir-
ical data that is not predicted by the model. I discuss possible interpretations of
this trend below. Figure 8D also compares the model to modern evidence, but
measures inequality using the top 1% income share. The empirical data is in a
range that is consistent with the model. Again, there is a downward trend in the
empirical data, but far less pronounced than in Fig. 8C.
To summarize, EHI model predictions for the origin of inequality are consis-
tent with the available evidence. But for industrial societies, the model predic-
tions are more ambiguous. Modern evidence is within the range predicted by
the model. However, the data shows a decline of inequality with energy use that
is not predicted.
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Figure 8: Testing the Energy-Hierarchy-Inequality Model
This figure compares the EHI model to empirical data. Panel A shows archaeological
data from ancient societies, measured using housing size and reported by ‘adaptation’.
Horizontal lines indicate the plausible range of energy use for each adaptation. Panel
B shows income inequality in pre-industrial societies. Energy use is estimated from per
capita income data (horizontal lines show the uncertainty). Panel C shows data for
modern nation-states, with vertical lines showing the range of inequality estimates for
each country. Panel D also shows modern data, but measures inequality using the top
1% income share. For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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A.  Economic Inequality B.  Inferred β (Hierarchical Despotism)
Figure 9: Is the Kuznets Curve Caused by Declining Hierarchical Despotism?
Panel A plots all of the empirical data in Fig. 8A-C. The red line shows the smoothed
trend. It has an inverted U shape, often called a ‘Kuznets curve’. Panel B shows inferred
β for each society. This is the scaling of income with hierarchical power that is required
if the EHI model is correct. I infer β by matching real-world societies to the EHI model.
I interpret β as an index of ‘hierarchical despotism’ — it measures elites’ ability to use
their hierarchical power to concentrate resources.
4.2 The Kuznets Curve: The Decline of Hierarchical Despotism?
Figure 9A aggregates all the empirical data in Fig. 8A-C to show the long-term
trend between energy use and inequality. A clear ‘Kuznets curve’ [87] emerges
(an inverted U-shaped relation). Inequality tends first to increase with energy
use, and then decline. The increase is predicted by the model, but the decrease
is not. Is the model wrong?
More evidence is required to answer this question. The problem is that the
model predicts a huge range of ‘inequality space’ for industrial societies. The
range of this space is determined by β — the scaling of income with hierarchical
rank. I have assumed that the distribution of β is independent of energy use. But
this could be wrong. To test the model, we need independent estimates of β in
real-world societies. Such estimates do not presently exist.
While we cannot confirm or falsify the model, we can infer how β should
behave if the model is correct. To do this, we match the empirical data to the
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best-fit model iteration. We then assign the model’s β to the real-world society.
The resulting inference is shown in Figure 9B. If the model is correct, β should
decline with energy use.
Future research can test this inference. For now, I reflect on what it means.
The parameter β determines how rapidly income scales with hierarchical power.
I interpret β as an index of hierarchical despotism. It measures elites’ ability to
use their hierarchical power to concentrate resources. A larger β indicates a
more despotic hierarchy (greater returns to hierarchical power). The model
predicts that hierarchical despotism declines as energy use increases.
This suggests that the Kuznets curve is created by two trends that accompany
increases in energy: (1) the growth of hierarchy; and (2) the decline of hierar-
chical despotism. The first half of the Kuznets curve is created by the growth of
hierarchy, which concentrates hierarchical power, leading to greater inequality.
But hierarchical power concentration eventually plateaus. At this point, the de-
cline in hierarchical despotism dominates the trend. This causes the second half
of the Kuznets curve — inequality declines with greater energy use.
The decline of hierarchical despotism is an untested inference. But it seems
plausible. History suggests that as societies develop, they introduce checks on
power. These include the rule of law, democracy, and labor unions. Might these
checks on power gradually reduce hierarchical despotism? Future research can
test if this is true.
5 Discussion
The results of the model suggest that the energy-hierarchy-inequality hypothesis
is plausible. Extrapolating the modern relation between energy use, hierarchy,
and inequality leads to a prediction for the origin of inequality that is consistent
with the available evidence. Of course, the model makes a number of assump-
tions that need to be tested independently in the future. But for now, we can
speculate about the mechanisms at work.
The results suggest that understanding the origin of inequality requires un-
derstanding the emergence of hierarchy. After hundreds of thousands of years
of (relatively) egalitarian organization, why would humans suddenly choose to
organize in despotic hierarchies? Was there an advantage, as functionalist the-
ory contends [88, 89]? Or was it a matter of coercion, as conflict theory con-
tends [90–93]? Or did the emergence of hierarchy involved both function and
coercion [94–97]? I think the latter is most likely. Without a functional ad-
vantage, it is hard to understand why hierarchy would emerge. But without
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coercion, it is hard to understand the great inequalities that exist within hierar-
chies.
Let’s begin with the advantages of hierarchy. The modern evidence indicates
that hierarchy increases with energy use. One interpretation is that hierarchy
somehow enables, or is necessary for, greater energy use (for a different inter-
pretation, see [98]). If this is true, then we need to ask two questions. First,
why is using more energy advantageous? Second, why is hierarchy required to
use more energy?
Regarding the first question, if life is the struggle for energy [34, 99], then
using more energy may give a competitive advantage to an organism (or group
of organisms). This is the idea behind the maximum power principle, which at-
tempts to give an energetic basis to Darwinian fitness [100–102]. It proposes
that organisms (and ecosystems) evolve to maximize power — the flow of energy
per unit of time. While it has some empirical support [103,104], the maximum
power principle remains controversial. Still, there are clear instances where us-
ing more energy is advantageous to human groups. The most conspicuous is
warfare. The evolution of military armament is towards increasingly devastat-
ing weaponry (bows and arrows, guns, missiles, and nuclear warheads). This
reduces to energetics: the destructive capability of a weapon is proportional
to the amount of energy it releases. We need only look at the history of Eu-
ropean conquest to see how better armament led to a group advantage [105].
Greater energy use may also allow reproductive benefits. For instance, in ex-
isting traditional societies, agrarian societies tend to have higher fertility than
hunter-gatherers and horticulturists [106]. To summarize, using more energy
may be advantageous in inter-group competition. The idea is that higher energy-
using groups out compete lower energy-using groups in a form of ‘group selec-
tion’ [107,108].
But why is greater energy use associated with greater hierarchy? One pos-
sibility is that using more energy requires greater social coordination, and hier-
archy is the most potent way to achieve this. Here is my reasoning. Increasing
energy use involves profound technological changes. Most notably, the scale and
complexity of technology increases [50]. I suggest that this increasing complex-
ity requires more social coordination. This is where hierarchy comes in. While
humans can organize without hierarchy, the scale appears limited. The problem
is that human sociability likely has biological limits [109]. Individuals generally
cannot maintain more than a few hundred social relations. Hierarchy sidesteps
these limits [61]. A member of a hierarchy needs to interact only with his direct
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superior and direct subordinates. This allows group size to grow without the
need for more social interactions.
If hierarchy confers energetic benefits (via coordination), we can imagine a
feedback loop emerging: Hierarchical organization enables large-scale coordi-
nation that then enables greater energy use, that then enables more hierarchy
(and so on). This explains why energy and hierarchy go together. But it leads
to a problem. For the vast majority of human history, hierarchical organization
was negligible. Clearly there was no energy-hierarchy feedback loop. What are
we missing?
The missing ingredient is resource distribution within the hierarchy. The
problem is that hierarchy is a double-edged sword. It allows greater coordina-
tion, but it also leads to despotism. The nested chain of command gives enor-
mous power to top-ranked individuals. When this power is (predictably) used
for personal gain, it leads to vast inequalities. This would explain why income
scales with hierarchical power. The resulting inequality means that hierarchy
may not benefit low-ranking individuals. If the material gains from coordination
are monopolized by elites, low-ranking individuals may be better off leaving the
hierarchy. The stability of a hierarchy thus depends on the net advantage for
low-ranking individuals [97]. If there is no advantage, the hierarchy will be
unstable.
For the majority of human history, the costs of hierarchical despotism likely
outweighed any coordination benefits from hierarchy. We know that modern
hunter-gatherers (and presumably ancient ones as well) aggressively suppress
individuals with power-seeking tendencies [110, 111]. Without a concentrated
energy source (such as agriculture) the benefits to large-scale coordination were
likely marginal. Therefore, hierarchy was not tolerated because it conferred no
advantage.
This likely changed during the Neolithic revolution. The details remain poorly
understood, but we can guess that the benefits of large-scale coordination in-
creased. This is likely related to sedentism and the development of agricul-
ture [112, 113]. Irrigation likely also played an important role [114, 115]. I
argue that during the Neolithic revolution, the energy-hierarchy feedback loop
took hold. As a result, hierarchical power became more concentrated. Elites
predictably used their power for personal gain, resulting in the emergence of
inequality.
I have so far treated inequality as an effect of hierarchy. But it may actually
play a role in the growth of hierarchy. I have argued that the growth of hierarchy
depends on the net advantage to low-ranking individuals. One way to increase
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this advantage is to increase the returns to hierarchical coordination (through
environmental or technological change). But another way to increase the net
advantage is to decrease hierarchical despotism. If the gains of hierarchy are
more equally distributed, the net benefit to low-ranking members is greater.
This reasoning means that inequality may play a causal role in the growth of
hierarchy and the growth of energy use. This is speculation, but it fits with the
the inference that hierarchical despotism declines with energy use (Fig. 9B).
Perhaps limiting hierarchical despotism is a prerequisite for industrialization?
Or put another way, is it possible to have an industrial economy built on slavery
— the most despotic mode of human organization? These are open questions
worth investigating.
To summarize, I think that understanding the energy-hierarchy-inequality
relation requires merging both functional and conflict theories of social stratifi-
cation. It requires understanding what Wilson calls the “ fundamental problem
of social life” [107]. The idea is that cooperative groups beat uncooperative
groups. But selfish individuals beat unselfish individuals within groups. Hier-
archy nicely highlights both aspects of this problem. It is a powerful tool for
coordination, and thus has potential group benefits. But it is also predictably
used for selfish gain, thus resulting in great inequality. Thinking in this way may
provide an important tool for understanding the origin of inequality.
6 Conclusions
Origin questions are some of the most seductive in science. At the same time,
they are among the most difficult questions to answer. The problem is that ori-
gins are always locked in the past, meaning evidence is frustratingly sparse.
Scientific progress on origin questions happens when we find reliable windows
into the past.
It is instructive to see how new windows of evidence have led to advances in
other fields. In modern cosmology, the breakthrough came with the discovery
of galaxy recession (Hubble’s law) and later the discovery of the microwave
background radiation. Both suggest that the universe originated in a big bang
[116]. In biology, the breakthrough came with the discovery of DNA. The genetic
code can be used to infer the long-term evolution of life, and it suggests that all
life has a single origin [117].
What about the origin of economic inequality? Obviously we should continue
to gather historical and archaeological evidence. But this evidence will always
remain limited. We should also continue studying traditional societies. But these
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societies are rapidly disappearing from the world. That leaves modern societies
as a source of evidence.
I have tested the hypothesis that we can infer the origin of inequality using
the modern relation between energy use, hierarchy, and inequality. To do this I
created a numerical model that extrapolates modern trends into the past. The
results are promising. The model predicts a relation between energy and in-
equality that is consistent with the available evidence. This suggests that signs
of humanity’s past are encoded in the hierarchical structure of our own societies.
If this is correct, it may offer a new window into the origin of inequality.
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Appendices
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work:
https://osf.io/7b8tu/
Materials include source data and analysis code, as well as code for the energy-
hierarchy-inequality model.
A Sources and Methods
Figure 1
Data for firm size comes from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), se-
ries ‘omnowjob’. To calculate firm size, I merge all data over the years 2001-
2014. Because the GEM data over-represents large firms, I use only firms with
1000 or fewer employees. For method details, see the Appendix in Ref. [50].
Uncertainty in average firm size is estimated using the bootstrap method. Firm
size distribution power-law exponents are estimated using the R PoweRlaw pack-
age [118]. Energy data comes from the World Bank, series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE.
Figure 3 & 4
Firm case-study data comes from [52–57]. For details of this data, and the meth-
ods used to analyze it, see Appendices in [63,119].
Figure 7
I assume that human metabolic needs range from 2000 Kcal to 2500 Kcal per
day. Western and Eastern Eurasia energy use data comes from Morris [86]. US
total energy consumption is from Historical Statistics of the United States, Ta-
bles Db164-171 (1900-1948) and Energy Information Agency Table 1.3 (1949-
2000). US population is from Maddison [120]. Qatar data comes from the World
Bank (series EG.USE. PCAP.KG.OE).
Figure 8
Panel A. Archaeological inequality data is from Kohler et al. [18] and is mea-
sured using house size. I estimate the energy use range for each adaptation
using the data in Table 1. Results for this energy range are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Energy Use Estimates by Adaptation
Table 1: Adaptation Energy Use Data Sources
Society Energy (GJ/capita) Adaptation Source
Agrarian max 38 agriculture [86]
Bangladesh circa 1979 11.4 agriculture [121]
Catalonia 1860 34.6 agriculture [122]
Classical Greek 30.5 agriculture [86]
Classical Greek 38 agriculture [86]
Czechia 1850 39 agriculture [123]
England Wales 1560 20 agriculture [124]
England Wales 1600 17.4 agriculture [124]
Europe 1500 CE 30 agriculture [125]
Generic 26 agriculture [126]
Han China 41 agriculture [86]
Rome 9.2 agriculture [127]
Rome 16.8 agriculture [127]
Rome 38 agriculture [86]
Sang Saeng 48 agriculture [128]
Song China 45 agriculture [86]
Trinket Island 39 agriculture [129]
World 1820 19.2 agriculture [130]
Generic 12 horticulture [126]
Human-powered agriculture 9.5 horticulture [131]
Generic 3.8 hunting-gathering [131]
Generic 5 hunting-gathering [126]
Western Eurasia 10,000 BCE 7.6 hunting-gathering [86]
Western Eurasia 14,000 BCE 6.1 hunting-gathering [86]
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Panel B. Pre-industrial inequality data is from Milanovic [29]. I estimate en-
ergy use from reported values of GDP per capita. To do this, I extrapolate the
modern international relation between real GDP per capita and energy use per
capita. Data for this regression comes from the World Bank (series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE
and NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD).
Panel C. Inequality data comes from three sources: the World Inequality Database
(Gini index calculated from Lorenz curves), the United Nations World Income
Inequality Database, and the OECD. I merge all data into a single database and
estimate the range of inequality from this data. Points in Panel C represent
the median inequality estimate for each country-year observation. Error bars
represent the 90% range. Energy use data comes from the World Bank, series
EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE.
Panel D. Top 1% income share data is from the World Inequality Database.
Points in Panel D represent the median inequality estimate for each country-
year observation. Error bars represent the 90% range. Energy use data is from
the World Bank, series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE
Figure 9
Panel A. See sources for Fig. 8.
Panel B. I match the empirical data to the best fit model iteration by minimiz-
ing the follow error function:
ε= | log Er − log Em|+ |Gr − Gm| (3)
Here Er and Em are energy use per capita in the real-world society and model,
respectively. Gr and Gm are the Gini index in the real-world society and model,
respectively.
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A.1 Power-Law Distribution of US Slave Ownership
US South 1860
Power Law
α = 2.7
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Figure 11: Distribution of Slave Ownership in the US South in 1860
The blue line shows the distribution of slave ownership in the US South. ‘Steps’ indicate
the bins in the original data. The red line shows the best-fit power-law distribution,
which has an exponent α = 2.7 . The shaded region indicates the range of uncertainty
for a sample of 1 million. Slave-estate size roughly follows a power-law distribution.
Data is from [132], as reported in [133]. The best-fit power law is determined using
the methods in [134].
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B Hierarchy Model Equations
In this section, I outline the mathematics underlying my hierarchical model of
institutions. The model assumes that institutions are hierarchically structured,
with a span of control that increases exponentially with hierarchical level.
B.1 Generating the Employment Hierarchy
To generate the hierarchical structure of an institution, we begin by defining
the span of control (s) as the ratio of employment (E) between two consecutive
hierarchical levels (h), where h = 1 is the bottom hierarchical level. It simplifies
later calculations if we define the span of control in level 1 as s = 1. This leads
to the following piecewise function:
sh ≡
 1 if h = 1Eh
Eh−1
if h≥ 2 (4)
The model assumes that the span of control is not constant; rather it increases
exponentially with hierarchical level. I model the span of control as a function
Table 2: Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
E employment
h hierarchical level
n number of hierarchical levels in a institution
s span of control
T total for institution
↓ round down to nearest integer∏
product of a sequence of numbers∑
sum of a sequence of numbers
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of hierarchical level (sh) with a simple exponential function, where a and b are
free parameters:
sh =
(
1 if h = 1
a · ebh if h≥ 2 (5)
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh)
decreases by 1/sh. This yields Eq. 6, a recursive method for calculating Eh. Since
we want employment to be whole numbers, we round down to the nearest inte-
ger (notated by ↓). By repeatedly substituting Eq. 6 into itself, we can obtain a
non-recursive formula (Eq. 7). In product notation, Eq. 7 can be written as Eq.
8.
Eh =↓ Eh−1sh for h> 1 (6)
Eh =↓ E1 · 1s2 ·
1
s3
· ... · 1
sh
(7)
Eh =↓ E1
h∏
i=1
1
si
(8)
Total employment in the whole institution (ET ) is the sum of employment in
all hierarchical levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we
get Eq. 9, which in summation notation, becomes Eq. 10.
ET = E1 + E2 + ...+ En (9)
ET =
n∑
h=1
Eh (10)
In practice, n is not known beforehand, so we define it using Eq. 8. We
progressively increase h until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest
level n will be the hierarchical level directly below the first hierarchical level with
zero employment:
n = {h | Eh ≥ 1 and Eh+1 = 0} (11)
To summarize, the hierarchical employment structure of our model institu-
tion is determined by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and
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b, and base-level employment E1. Code for this hierarchy generation algorithm
can be found in the C++ header files hierarchy.h and exponents.h, located
in the Supplementary Material.
B.2 Calculating Hierarchical Power in the Hierarchy Model
I define an individual’s hierarchical power as one plus the number of subordi-
nates (S) under their control:
P = 1+ S (12)
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of insti-
tutions (employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as
an average per rank. For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (P¯h)
is defined as the average number of subordinates (S¯h) plus 1:
P¯h = 1+ S¯h (13)
Each individual with rank h is assigned the average power P¯h. The average
number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subor-
dinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question:
S¯h =
h−1∑
i=1
Ei
Eh
(14)
Figure 12: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
As an example, consider the hierarchy in Figure 12. The average number of
subordinates below each individual in hierarchical level 3 (red) would be:
S¯3 =
E1 + E2
E3
=
16+ 8
4
= 6 (15)
Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
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Table 3: Model Parameters
Parameter Definition Action Scope
α
Institution size distribution
exponent
Determines the skewness of the
institution size distribution
—
a, b Span of control parameters
Determines the shape of the
institution hierarchy.
Identical for all
institutions.
E1
Employment in base
hierarchical level
Used to build the employment
hierarchy from the bottom up.
Determines total employment.
Specific to each firm.
β Power-income exponent
Determines scaling relation between
income and hierarchical power.
Identical for all
institutions.
σ Noise parameter
Used to add noise to the
power-income relation. It is the scale
parameter of a lognormal
distribution
Identical for all
institutions.
C Restricting Model Parameters
The hierarchy model’s parameters are summarized in Table 3. My method for
choosing these parameters is detailed below.
C.1 Institution Size Distribution Power-Law Exponent
Recent studies have found that firm size distributions in the United States [48]
and other G7 countries [51] can be modeled accurately with a power law. A
power law has the simple form shown in Eq. 16, where the probability of obser-
vation x is inversely proportional to x raised to the exponent α:
p(x)∝ 1
xα
(16)
The hierarchy model assumes that all human societies have power-law insti-
tution size distributions. The model simulates different societies by allowing the
power-law exponent α to vary stochastically between different model iterations.
A characteristic property of power-law distributions is that asα approaches 2,
the mean becomes undefined. In the present context, this means that the model
Restricting Model Parameters 30
can produce institution sizes that are extremely large — far beyond anything
that exists in the real world. To deal with this difficulty, I truncate the power-
law distribution at a maximum institution size of 2.3 million. This happens to
be the present size of Walmart, the largest firm that has every existed.
Code for the discrete power-law random number generator can be found in
the C++ header file rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material. This code
is an adaptation of Collin Gillespie’s [118] discrete power-law generator found
in the R poweRlaw package (which is, in turn, an adaptation of the algorithm
outline by Clauset [135]).
C.2 Span of Control Parameters
The parameters a and b together determine the shape of institutional hierarchy.
These parameters are estimated from an exponential regression on firm case-
study data (Fig. 13A). The model assumes that these parameters are constant
across all institutions. The resulting modeled hierarchy shape is shown in Figure
13B
Because the case-study sample size is small, there is considerable uncertainty
in the span of control parameters. I incorporate this uncertainty into the model
using the bootstrap method [136], which involves repeatedly resampling the
case-study data (with replacement) and then estimating the parameters a and
b from this resample. I run the model many times, each time with a and b
determined by a bootstrap resample of case-study data. The resulting variation
in the shape of the model’s hierarchies is indicated by the error bars in Figure
13B.
Code implementing this bootstrap can be found in the C++ header file
boot_span.h.
C.3 Base-Level Employment
Given span of control parameters a and b, each institution hierarchy is con-
structed from the bottom hierarchical level up. Thus, we must know base level
employment. To get this value, I input a range of different base employment val-
ues into equations 5, 8, and 10 and calculate total employment for each value.
The result is a discrete mapping relating base-level employment to total employ-
ment. I then use the C++ Armadillo interpolation function to linearly interpolate
between these discrete values. This allows us to predict base level E1, given to-
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B.  Modeled Institutional Hierarchy (Determined by Case−Study Regression)
Figure 13: Idealized Hierarchy Implied by Firm Case Studies
Panel A shows how the span of control (the subordinate-to-superior ratio between ad-
jacent levels) varies with hierarchical level in case-study firms. The x-axis corresponds
to the upper hierarchical level in each corresponding ratio. Case-study firms are indi-
cated by color. Horizontal ‘jitter’ has been introduced to better visualize the data. The
line indicates an exponential regression, with the grey region indicating the regression
95% confidence interval. Panel B shows the idealized firm hierarchy that is implied by
the regression in Panel A. Error bars show the uncertainty in the hierarchical shape,
calculated using a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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tal employment ET . Code implementing this method can be found in the C++
header file base_fit.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
C.4 Power-Income Exponent
The model assumes that income scales with hierarchical power as
Ih
I1
= (Ph)
β · ε (17)
where Ih is income in hierarchical level h, I1 is income in the base hierarchical
level, P is hierarchical power, and ε is the stochastic noise factor.
To simulate variation between societies, I allow β to vary over different
model iterations. I use two different data sources to determine a plausible range
for this variation. The first is case-study data from modern firms [52–57]. I de-
termine β from regressions on the data shown in Figure 4. For each case-study
firm, I regress log(Ih/I1) onto log Ph. The slope of the relation is the estimate
for β . I estimate the uncertainty in β using the bootstrap method [136]. I re-
peatedly resample case-study data and re-run the regression to estimate β . The
resulting probability distribution of β is shown in Figure 14A for each case-study
firm.
The second data source is a case study of a US slave estate — Cannon’s Point
Plantation [137]. I estimate β from the living standard of the plantation owner
relative to his slaves. For this estimate, we solve the power-income relation for
β:
β =
log(Ih/I1)
log(Ph)
(18)
Although we do not know the hierarchical structure of the slave estate, we
know that the owner sits on top of the hierarchy. All of the slaves are his sub-
ordinates. Therefore the number of slaves (nslave) gives us a rough estimate for
the owner’s hierarchical power:
Powner ≈ 1+ nslave (19)
If we know the living standard of the owner (Iowner) and slaves (Islave), we can
combine Eq. 18 and Eq. 19 to get a rough estimate for β:
β ≈ log(Iowner/Islave)
log(1+ nslave)
(20)
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Figure 14: Probability Distribution of β in Case-Study Institutions
This figure shows the probability distribution of the parameter β in different case-study
institutions. This parameter indicates the scaling behavior between income and hi-
erarchical power: income ∝ (hierarchical power)β . Probabilities are determined us-
ing the bootstrap method. Panel A shows the β probability distribution for case-study
firms [52–57]. Panel B shows the β probability distribution for a US slave estate (Can-
non’s Point Plantation [137]). I show results for measuring inequality in terms of both
house size and income.
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The living standard of the owner is equal to his income. But slaves have
no income, so we must use another method to estimate their living standards.
One way is to use the slave expenses paid by the owner. Another method is
to compare the owner and slaves in terms of house size. The results for both
methods are shown in 14B. Again, I use the bootstrap technique to investigate
the plausible range of β that is implied by the Cannon’s Point data. I sample
different values for the owner’s income, the slaves’ income (living standard),
and the number of slaves and put them repeatedly into Eq. 20.
As we would expect, the resulting β for our slave estate is far higher than
in our case-study firms. In a slave regime, the evidence suggests that β could
approach 1. To put this in perspective, this means income scales linearly with hi-
erarchical power. If this were the case in industrial societies, the CEO of Walmart
would earn 2 million times that of an entry-level worker. Nothing like this exists
in industrial societies — for good reason. They are not based on slavery. But
slavery was ubiquitous in human history, so we need to allow for its existence in
our model.
Based on the case-study data in Figure 14, I allow β to vary over the range
0.2≤ β ≤ 1.
C.5 Power-Income Noise Factor
Noise (ε) in the power-income relation is modeled with a lognormal random
variate with dispersion determined by the parameter σ:
ε∼ lnN (σ) (21)
The noise factor reproduces the average within-hierarchical level income dis-
persion in case-study firms [52–57]. The distribution of within-hierarchal level
income dispersion is shown in Figure 15. To determine σ, we first calculate
the mean Gini index (G¯) of the case-study data shown in Figure 15. We then
calculate σ using:
σ = 2 · erf−1(G¯) (22)
This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a lognormal
distribution: G = erf(σ/2). To incorporate uncertainty in the case-study data,
each model iteration uses a different bootstrap resample to calculate G¯. Code
implementing this method can be found in the C++ header file boot_sigma.h,
located in the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 15: Determining the Power-Income ‘Noise’ Parameter
This figure shows the distribution of income dispersion within hierarchical levels of
case-study firms, measured using the Gini index. The mean of this distribution (with
associated uncertainty) is used to set the power-income noise parameter σ.
C.6 Summary of Model Structure
The model is implemented in C++ using a modular design. Each major task is
carried out by a separate function that is defined in a corresponding header file.
Table 4 summarizes this structure sequentially in the order that functions are
called. In each step, I briefly summarize the action that is performed, giving
reference to the section where this action is described in detail.
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Table 4: Model High-Level Structure
Step Action Reference Section Parameter(s) Header File(s)
1 Bootstrap case-study data C.2 a, b
boot_span.h
boot_sigma.h
2
Generate power-law
institution size distribution
C.1 α rpld.h
3
Get simulation base-level
employment
C.3 E1 base_fit.h
4
Generate hierarchies, get
hierarchical power for each
individual
B all model.h
Notes: The hierarchy model code makes extensive use of Armadillo, an open-source C++ linear algebra
library [138].
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